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Bank response to capital requirements:  
Theory and Indian evidence 
 
D M Nachane, Aditya Narain, Saibal Ghosh and Satyananda Sahoo1 
Introduction 
It has been widely observed that throughout the 1970s, the capital ratios of many banks 
throughout the world declined significantly2. In an attempt to reverse this decline, the bank 
regulators in several countries issued explicit capital standards for banks (and bank holding 
companies, as in the United States in December 1981). These standards required banks to hold a 
fixed percentage of their total assets as capital. Although these minimum regulatory standards 
have been given credit for increasing bank capital levels, the ‘1980s also witnessed a number of 
bank failures. Several authors, including Lindgren et al. (1996) have observed that, since 1980, 
over 130 countries, comprising almost three fourths of IMF’s member countries have experienced 
significant banking problems. Research by Alfriend (1988) has also confirmed the fact that a 
weakness of the minimum capital standards was that they failed to acknowledge the heterogeneity 
of bank assets and, as a result, banks had an incentive to shift their portfolios from low-risk to 
high-risk assets. 
In response to the widespread criticism about declining capital standards of banks and the 
consequent bank failures, in 1989, the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
announced the adoption of risk-based capital standards. The primary purpose of these standards 
was to make bank capital requirements responsive to the risk in the asset portfolio of banks. 
Although capital ratios at commercial banks have increased since the risk-based standards have 
been introduced, the question arose as to what degree these increases were a response, 
specifically to risk-based capital standards.3 Furthermore, although the adoption of risk-based 
standards has focused attention on capital levels and bank lending, insufficient attention has been 
devoted to the related issue of how the adoption of the risk-based standards may have impacted 
bank-portfolio risk levels.4 In general, at least some theoretical and empirical research have raised 
                                                          
1Professor, Department of Economics, Vidyanagari, C.S.T.Road, Kalina Campus, Mumbai 400098; 
General Manager, Department of Banking Supervision, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai  and Research 
Officers, Department of Economic Analysis and Policy, Reserve Bank of India, Mumbai, respectively. The 
views expressed in the paper are entirely personal and do not, in any way, reflect those of the institution to 
which the authors’ belong. 
2Evidence in support of this for US, UK and Canadian banks has been provided by Saunders and Wilson 
(1999), while Jackson et al. (1999) have adduced evidence to support this for banks in the G-10 countries. 
3 As observed by Jackson et al. (1999), the average ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets of major banks in 
the G-10 countries increased from 9.3 per cent in 1988 to 11.2 per cent in 1996. 
4 For recent studies addressing the impact of risk-based capital standards on bank lending and the credit 
crunch, see Berger and Udell (1993), Shrieves and Drew (1995) and Berger (1995). 
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the possibility that increasing regulatory capital standards might have caused banks to increase, 
rather than decrease, portfolio risk. Furthermore, greater amounts of capital, per se, are no 
guarantee that banks are adequately capitalised. Rather, from a public policy perspective, what is 
important is the amount of capital a bank holds relative to the level of risk in its portfolio. 
 
2. Received Literature 
In recent years, a number of theoretical and empirical studies have examined the impact 
of regulatory capital standards on bank portfolio risk. For example, using the mean-variance 
framework, Kim and Santomero (1980) and Koehn and Santomero (1988) have shown that 
increasing regulatory capital standards may have the unintended effect of causing utility 
(shareholder value) maximising banks to increase portfolio risk. Under these conditions, changes 
in capital and portfolio risk would be positively correlated. In contrast, studies such as Benston et 
al. (1986) have observed that bank capital and portfolio risk may be negatively correlated, as 
banks maximize the option value of deposit insurance by reducing capital and increasing risk. 
Furthermore, Furlong and Keeley (1989) have argued that the mean-variance approach is 
inappropriate because it ignores the option value of deposit insurance. Using a contingent claims 
model, their results suggest that increased capital standards will not cause banks to increase 
portfolio risk. This occurs because an increase in capital reduces the value of the deposit 
insurance put option, thereby reducing the incentive for banks to increase portfolio risk levels. 
However, one important limitation of the study is that banks continue to have an incentive to 
maximise risk in the model; an increase in capital merely reduces the magnitude of the gains from 
risk-taking activity. Gennotte and Pyle (1991) incorporated an adjustment for the value of deposit 
insurance as suggested by Keeley and Furlong (1990) and also allowed for the expected return on 
an asset to decrease as a bank increases its holdings. They found that even if an interior optimum 
for size and risk exists, then a rise in the capital level would lead to increased investment in the 
risky asset and a greater probability of failure.  
Addressing the issue of risk-based capital regulations, Kim and Santomero (1988) 
examined how the design of risk-based capital standards influences the level of risk in bank 
portfolios. The results are particularly interesting, because they found that a risk-based rule 
designed to minimize the probability of bank failure would lead banks to choose high-risk assets. 
Empirical evidence on the issue presents conflicting conclusions. The study by Haubrich and 
Watchel (1993) shows how the implementation of the Basle risk standards caused poorly-
capitalised banks to reconfigure their portfolios away from high-risk and towards low-risk assets. 
This result, however, runs contrary to that of Hancock and Wilcox (1992) who found that, banks 
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that had less capital than required by the risk-based standards, shifted their portfolios towards 
high-risk assets.  
 
3. Risk-based capital standards 
In July 1988, the BCBS approved the adoption of a risk-based capital standard for banks 
in member countries.5 Prior to the implementation of these risk-based capital standards, banks in 
the G-10 were subject to leverage requirements which mandated banks to hold a flat percentage 
of their assets as capital, irrespective of the level of risk in their portfolio. 
Beginning December 31, 1990, the risk-based capital standards supplemented the existing 
leverage requirement. Although the risk-based capital standards were designed to make capital 
standards similar across all countries on the Basle Committee, their primary purpose was to 
require banks to hold capital in accordance with the perceived risk in their portfolio. To 
accomplish this, the risk-based capital standards explicitly linked capital to risk by assigning risk 
weights to broad categories of on- and off-balance sheet assets. After assigning assets to the 
appropriate risk category, the bank calculated its total risk-weighted assets as the sum of the value 
of each asset multiplied by the corresponding risk weight.6 As a final step, banks were required to 
hold capital equal to a certain percentage of the total risk-weighted assets. Under the risk-based 
standards, capital consists of two parts: tier-I capital (comprising of equity capital and published 
reserves from post-tax retained earnings) and tier-II capital (comprising of hybrid debt capital 
instruments, loan loss reserves, sub-ordinated debt, etc.).  
 
4. Limitations of risk-based capital standards 
Under an ideal risk-based capital system, any increase in the bank’s portfolio risk would 
be accompanied by an increase in capital to act as a buffer against possible losses arising from the 
additional risks. This implies that the risk-based capital standards should explicitly link changes 
in required bank capital with changes in earnings exposure risk. However, conceptual weaknesses 
in the risk-based standards may undermine the relationship between changes in portfolio risk and 
changes in required capital. One reason for this is that the current risk-based capital standards 
account primarily for credit risk. Thus, a capital deficient bank can, at the margin, improve its 
risk-based capital ratio by substituting interest-sensitive, low credit risk assets, such as 
                                                          
5 The 10 countries are Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, United 
Kingdom and the United States (plus Luxembourg and Switzerland). 
6 The risk-based capital standards also incorporated off-balance sheet activities. This is done by converting 
the value of the off-balance sheet item to an on-balance sheet credit exposure equivalent. The on-balance 
sheet equivalent is then multiplied by the corresponding risk weight and added to the bank’s total risk-
weighted assets. 
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Government bonds, for shorter term, higher interest-sensitive assets, such as commercial loans. 
Furthermore, other types of risks, such as interest rate risks, credit concentration risks etc., are not 
explicitly recognized by the risk-based standards.  
In addition, as Keeton (1989), Avery and Berger (1991b), and Kaufman (1992) have 
observed, if the risk weights used in the risk-based capital standards do not accurately reflect the 
true risk of an asset, then banks may actually have an incentive to increase portfolio risk. This 
situation occurs, in part, because the risk-based standards use simplified risk classifications, 
which create an incentive for banks to arbitrage both between and within risk categories. 
Evidence that the risk weights used in risk-based capital differ from actuarially fair premiums has 
been provided by Bradley et al. (1991) and Avery and Berger (1991a). Furthermore, by ignoring 
the benefits of portfolio diversification, the risk-based capital standards may not accurately 
differentiate between changes in asset composition which hedge portfolio risk and those that 
increase portfolio risk. It must also be recognised that the minimum risk-based capital standards, 
by themselves, do not limit the amount of risk in a bank’s portfolio. Rather, the risk-based 
standards dictate how much capital a bank must hold, conditional upon the estimated level of 
primarily credit risk in a bank’s portfolio. In fact, as discussed in previous Sections, the risk-
based capital standards may actually cause banks to increase portfolio risk. Last, but not the least, 
the risk-based capital standards overlook potential interactions between individual assets. The 
standards establish the relative risk weights based on the asset’s risk in isolation of other assets. 
Portfolio theory suggests that the relevant risk of an asset depend not only on its own variability, 
but also its covariance with other assets in the portfolio. The risk-based standards unfortunately 
fail to incorporate the latter. 
 
5.  Capital adequacy standards: The Indian experience 
Capital adequacy has traditionally been regarded as a sign of strength of the financial 
system in India. In terms of Section 17 of the Banking Regulation Act, 1949, every banking 
company incorporated in India is required to create a reserve fund and transfer a sum equivalent 
to not less than 20 per cent of its disclosed profits, to the reserve fund every year. The Reserve 
Bank has advised banks to transfer 25 per cent and if possible, 30 per cent to the reserve fund.  
Consequent upon the recommendations of the Committee on Financial Sector Reforms 
(Chairman: Shri M.Narasimham), a capital to risk-weighted assets system was introduced for 
banks in India since April 1992, largely in conformity with international standards, under which 
banks were required to achieve a 8 per cent capital to risk-assets ratio. Indian banks with branches 
abroad were given time till March 31, 1994 (subsequently extended to March 31, 1995) to 
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achieve the norm of 8 per cent CRAR; the capital was to comprise of tier I plus tier II capital, of 
which tier II should not exceed 100 per cent of tier I. Accordingly, the pattern of assigning risk 
weights and credit conversion factors were also delineated, broadly in line with those in the 
original Accord.7 Although the switchover to stringent prudential regime did affect the banking 
system in the initial years, the system exhibited adequate resilience to record substantial 
improvements in financial strength through higher CRAR over the period. Data for PSBs reveal 
that as on March 1996, while only 19 banks satisfied the CRAR of 8 per cent and above, the 
number increased to 26 in 1999. 
 
6. The model framework 
In order to assess how banks responded to the capital requirements, we first note the 
following simple identity: 
,**,
))((
TAPRCor
AssetsTotal
AssetsTotal
assetsweighedriskTotal
assetsweighedriskTotal
CapitalCapital
=
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where C=capital, R=risk-weighted capital ratio, P=portfolio factor, and TA=total assets. 
Using the superscript notation for proportionate changes (e.g., Z0=ΔZ/Z), we obtain, after some 
rearrangement, 
0000 TAPCR −−=                                                                                                                     (1) 
Because the risk-adjusted capital requirements are a constraint on R, we see from the above 
equation that the relation descriptively allocates the adjustment of banks to three possible courses 
of action: raise capital (increase C), adjust the portfolio factor (lower P) or shrink total assets 
(lower TA). 
Using the Basle standards as a benchmark for providing a basic framework of minimum 
capital standards, regulators in different countries have supplemented them with a range of other 
requirements designed to suit the country-specific requirements. Table 1 summarises the papers 
which examine this issue.  
As is evident from Table 1, most of the studies on capital adequacy and the concomitant 
portfolio shifts have been with regard to the US experience. The early literature covering US bank 
behaviour prior to the introduction of formal requirements in that country in 1981 confirms the 
fact that capital requirements implemented by supervisors on banks were merely indicative in 
nature. Peltzman (1970) and Mingo (1975) regressed percentage growth in capital on a range of 
                                                          
7 Keeping the realities of the Indian situation in mind, the risk weights on several on- and off balance sheet 
items were adjusted to reflect market realities. 
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conditioning variables, including the bank’s lagged ABC ratio. Peltzman (1970), using state-wide 
averaged data found insignificant effects of ABC ratios on subsequent bank capital changes. 
Mingo (1975) using bank-level data found strong and statistically significant positive effects. 
Although the methodology used in these studies was quite naïve, they however, put in place the 
basic framework that most subsequent analyses followed:  regressing a capital change variable on 
conditioning variables describing the financial state of the bank and the nature of its business (see 
also, Furfine, 2000). 
Table 1: Capital ratios and bank regulation 
Author/Year Country/ Period Issue 
Peltzman (1970) US banks  
1963-65 
ABC ratiosa 
Shrieves and Dahl (1992) US banks  
1984-86 
1981 standards 
Jacques and Nigro (1997) US banks  
1990-91 
Basle Accord 
Ediz, Michael and Perraudin (1998) UK banks  
1989-95 
Basle Accord plus extra capital 
requirements set on bank-specific 
basis 
Rime (2001) Swiss banks  
1989-95 
Basle Accord with more stringent 
risk weights 
a. The “ABC” ratio was the ratio of actual bank capital to the capital desired by the regulator. 
 
Subsequent research has mainly focused on changes in capital ratios (either leverage 
ratios or ratio of equity to total risk-weighted assets) rather then merely changes in capital growth 
rates. Second, early literature made no distinction between the short and the long-run effects of 
capital requirements (since capital growth was regressed only on conditioning variable and not on 
lagged capital or capital growth). Most subsequent research has employed a partial adjustment 
specification in which if Y(t) is the actual capital ratio of the bank and YD(t) is the bank’s target 
capital ratio at time t, then Y(t) is assumed to be of the form 
)()]1()([)1()( tutYtYDtYtY +−−=−− α                                                                              (2) 
In this case, u(t) is a random error term and α is a positive parameter. When Y(t-1) 
exceeds (resp., is less than) YD(t), the sign of α implies than Y(t)-Y(t-1) is, on average, negative 
(resp., positive). Hence, in the long run, Y(t) will tend to converge towards YD(t) and the 
magnitude of α reflects the rate at which such convergence occurs. Since the bank’s desired 
capital ratio YD(t) is unobservable, researchers have employed a proxy, typically replacing YD(t-
1) in equation (1.2) with a weighted sum, ΣiβiXi(t), where Xi are lagged conditioning variables 
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describing the state of the economy and the bank’s financial situation and the βi are the 
parameters to be estimated. 
The main papers which have investigated the impact of capital requirements using partial 
adjustment model are those of Shrieves and Dahl (1992) and Jacques and Nigro (1997). The 
former study, using data on 1,800 FDIC insured banks for the period 1983-87 found that banks 
with CRAR of less than 7 per cent (applied by the US authorities at that time), increased their 
ratio on average by 140 basis points per annum more as compared to other banks. Subsequently, 
Jacques and Nigro (1997) using a 3SLS method of estimation for US banks for the period 1990-
91, found that capital regulation had a significant impact on risk and vice versa.  
As evident, most of the papers have examined the issue of capital regulation with regard 
to US banks for different points of time. Recent studies, in regard to the UK (Ediz et al., 1998) 
and Switzerland (Rime, 2001) provide some useful evidence from non-US countries. Ediz et al. 
(1998) employed quarterly data on 94 UK banks over the period Q4 1989 to Q4 1995, while 
Rime (2001) looks at annual data on 154 Swiss banks between 1989 and 1995. Both these papers 
adopt a broadly similar specification. In particular, both introduce among the Xi variables 
dummies for capital pressure which equal unity when a bank’s capital ratio falls into a zone 
starting above the regulatory minimum. The gap between the starting point of the zone and the 
regulatory minimum varies across banks and is taken to be proportional to the time-series 
standard deviation of the banks’ own capital ratio. The specification captures the idea that (a) 
banks prefer to maintain a buffer level of capital over and above the regulatory minimum and (b) 
the width of the buffer will reflect the variability of the banks’ ratio8. Both these papers find that 
regulation is effective in the sense that the dummy variables described above have statistically 
significant coefficients. In the case of Rime (2001), the impact of regulation (i.e., of a dummy for 
the capital ratio, which is less than one standard deviation above the regulatory minimum) is 
statistically significant at the 1 per cent level, while in the case of Ediz et al.(1998), the ratio of 
capital to risk adjusted assets increased by 44 basis points per quarter more for banks in the 
regulatory pressure zone compared to adequately capitalised banks. 
Empirical insights from these studies can provide useful policy guidance to regulators in 
other countries to design their policy stance in accordance with the nature of the banking system 
in their countries. The regulatory authorities in the UK, for instance, earlier used to set two sets of 
capital requirements, a “trigger” ratio, which is the minimum ratio with which banks must comply 
and a “target” ratio, set above the trigger ratio. The purpose of having these dual capital standards 
serves two purposes: firstly, the gap between them acts as a “buffer” in the sense that regulatory 
                                                          
8 A description on trigger and target ratios in the UK is provided in Richardson and Stephenson (2000). 
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pressure is initiated when the actual capital to risk assets ratio (CRAR) falls below the target. If 
the CRAR falls even below the trigger level, supervisory authorities initiate even more drastic 
action. An important feature of such a practice is the specification of bank specific capital 
requirements9. Given the wide heterogeneity in terms of products and customer preferences 
among PSBs as well as the adjustment response of the PSBs, the regulatory framework should be 
designed so as to encourage individual banks to maintain higher CRAR than the stipulated 
minimum to reflect their differential risk profiles. Such adoption of bank-specific capital 
requirements has gained currency in recent times in view of the movement towards Risk-Based 
Supervision (RBS), which envisages inspection of institutions based on their risk profiles. Given 
that supervisory resources are scarce and different institutions have differential risk profiles, it 
would be useful if institutions were monitored according to their respective risk profiles. 
Riskiness, in such a situation would reflect supervisors’ evaluation of the banks’ loan book or 
possibly their perception about weaknesses in systems and controls. For most UK banks, for 
instance, capital requirements exceed the Basle minimum of 8 per cent. The ability to vary a 
bank’s capital requirements administratively provides the regulators with a useful tool for 
influencing the actions of the bank management.  
In the light of the aforesaid discussion, the present chapter seeks to address the following 
two issues: firstly, it seeks to examine, in the Indian context, whether capital requirements have 
been able to influence bank behaviour. The fact that capital requirements affect bank behaviour 
does not imply that the impact is undesirable. It is left to the discretion of bank supervisors to 
judge whether the induced levels of capital are adequate or not, given the broad goals of 
regulation. A second objective of the paper is to examine whether, consequent upon the 
introduction of the capital adequacy standards, there have been any discernible shifts within each 
asset category towards riskier assets (or otherwise). Given that the two standard avenues of 
capital augmentation i.e., securitisation and shifting from banking book to trading book-is not 
available for banks in India10, it therefore follows that banks would have either moved away from 
riskier assets in order to boost their capital adequacy levels or alternately, would perforce have to 
access the market so as to maintain prescribed levels of capital11 (equation 1).  
                                                          
9 The Report of the Committee on Banking Sector Reforms (Chairman: Shri M.Narasimham) which 
submitted its Report in 1998 had observed that, “the RBI should also have the authority to raise [the 
minimum capital to risk assets ratio] further in respect of individual banks if in its judgement the situation 
with respect to their risk profile warrants such an increase” (pp.21, para 3.15). 
10 Another way of capital augmentation is by raising average spreads (popularly termed as net interest 
margin). However, spreads have shown a decline in recent times for all bank groups. 
11 The trading book comprises both the short-term proprietary position taken by the bank in financial 
instruments for its own account, and its exposures relating to the provision of financial services to 
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The present paper employs supervisory data for Indian PSBs over the period 1997 Q1 to 
1999 Q4 to address the issues outlined above. The data is made available by the Off-Site 
Monitoring and Surveillance Division (OSMOS) of the Reserve Bank. Several points about the 
data are in order. Firstly, consequent upon the introduction of off-site returns for banks since 
1997, banks have been directed to submit data on mandated aspects of liquidity, solvency and 
asset quality on a quarterly basis12. The range and extent of disclosures have gradually been 
enhanced over the years so as to give a clearer picture of bank behaviour to the regulators. To the 
extent that the data have to be submitted within a stipulated time frame (typically 1-month of the 
close of the quarter), the timeliness of the information obtained enables the authorities to monitor 
and understand trends in important banking variables, It however needs to be recognised that the 
data for all quarters (except end-March) is unaudited. Notwithstanding the shortcoming, the short 
span of time (i.e., the close of banking business in every quarter) after which such data is obtained 
enables one to decipher, with a reasonable degree of accuracy several broad features of bank 
behaviour.  
The panel data used in the above study comprises quarterly balance sheet and income 
data stretching from 1997 Q1 to 1999 Q4 on the 27 PSBs. To the extent that PSBs constitute a 
sufficiently heterogeneous sample and comprise the bulk of the banking system in India13, a study 
confined to PSBs, in our view, suffices to draw broad inferences about shifts in the asset portfolio 
of the banking system as a whole. In particular, the two questions in which we are interested are 
(a) does pressure from supervisors affect bank capital dynamics when capital ratios approach 
their regulatory minimum, and (b) which items of their balance sheets bear the bulk of adjustment 
pressure when banks are subject to regulatory pressure? 
 
7. Empirical estimation 
The primary focus is towards understanding the impact of regulatory pressure on changes 
in capital, holding other influences on capital constant. This latter aspect is important because 
when a bank falls into financial distress, it might seek to adjust its capital in line with its own 
internally generated capital targets, even in the absence of intervention by regulators (Hancock 
and Wilcox, 1993). In line with the work of Ediz et al. (1998), we formulate a dynamic, 
multivariate panel regression model in which changes in capital ratios depend on the lagged level 
                                                                                                                                                                             
customers-for example, agency business. On the other hand, banking book comprises all other transactions, 
for example, lending and other types of credit activities and long-term investments. 
12 The second tranche of DSB returns covering the aspect of asset liability management has been introduced 
in July 1999.  
13 As at end-March 1997, end-March 1998 and end-March 1999, PSBs accounted for 80, 82 and 81 per 
cent, respectively, of the total assets of Scheduled Commercial Banks. 
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of the ratio, a range of conditioning variables describing the nature of the bank’s business and its 
current financial health (these proxy for the bank’s internal capital target), and variables that may 
be regarded as measuring regulatory pressure. Formally, our model may be stated as: 
tn
N
j
tnjtnjotntn YXYY ,
1
,,,,1, εβαα +++=− ∑
=
+                                                                            (3) 
where E(εn,t)= E(Xn,t,jεn,t)=0, t indicates the time period, n the cross-Sectional unit (bank) and 
where Xn,t,j (j=1,2,…, N) are a set of regressors. Further, 
tntntntn ,,,1, ∀+=+ ζερε                                                                                                          (4) 
where E(ζn,t)=0 for all n,t and E(ζn,t ζm,s)=0 for all t, s, n, m except when t=s and n=m. To include 
random effects, we suppose that for any bank, E(ζ2n, t)=σn2.  
First differencing of (1.3) introduces a correlation between the error term and the 
differenced lagged dependent variable. Therefore, OLS or ordinary panel estimation of (3) would 
produce biased results, even when the set of variables X is strictly exogenous. Such a scenario 
implies a set of moment restrictions can be used in the context of Generalised Method of 
Moments (GMM) to generate consistent and efficient estimates of the parameters of interest.  
The consistency of the GMM estimator depends on whether the lagged values of capital 
and other explanatory variables are valid instruments A necessary condition of the validity of 
such instruments is that the error term be serially uncorrelated. To address this issue, we present 
the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions as suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991): it tests 
the overall validity of the instruments by analysing the sample analog of the moment conditions 
used in the estimation process. Under this test, failure to reject the null hypothesis provides 
support to the model.  
The conditioning variables as employed in the study designed to proxy the bank’s own 
internal capital target and include the following ratios: (i) net interest income to total risk-
weighted assets (NIIRWA), (ii) fee income to total risk-weighted assets (FIRWA), (iii) bank 
deposits to total risk-weighted assets (BDRWA), (iv) total off-balance exposures to total risk-
weighted assets (OBSRWA), (v) profits to total risk-weighted assets (PFRWA), (vi) provisions to 
total risk-weighted assets (PVRWA) and (vii) 100-percent risk-weighted assets to total risk-
weighted assets (HRRWA). The net interest income, fee income and 100-percent risk weighted 
asset variables reflect the nature and riskiness of the banks’ operations. Bank deposits and off-
balance sheet exposures reflect the vulnerability to runs on deposits, although they may also 
reflect the degree of financial sophistication of the bank and its consequent ability to economise 
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on capital. Total profits and loan loss provisions variables indicate the bank’s state of financial 
health. 
Intuitively, while higher NIIRWA is expected to raise the capital adequacy ratio, similar 
is the case with FIRWA. Likewise, higher OBSRWA is also expected to raise the capital 
adequacy standards and the same is the case with PFRWA. Provisions, on the other hand, to the 
extent it represents an outflow, would lower the capital adequacy ratio. Finally, higher the level of 
deposits, higher would be capital required to sustain an eventuality of a run on deposits.  
Of particular interest for the present exercise are the regulatory pressure variables. We 
measure regulatory pressure in two ways. First, we incorporate a dummy variable that equals one 
if the bank has experienced an upward adjustment in its trigger ratio (the minimum CRAR that a 
bank must comply with) in the previous three quarters. This we refer to as the “trigger” dummy 
variable (TRIGD). The second variable we employ is referred to as “target” dummy variable 
(TARGD). The degree of proximity to the “trigger” CRAR depends not just on the absolute 
percentage difference between the current CRAR and the trigger, but also on the volatility of the 
CRAR. Hence, we calculate this dummy variable (TARGD) in such a way that it is unity if the 
CRAR is less than one bank-specific standard deviation above the bank’s trigger. Thus, our 
hypothesis is that there exists a zone above the trigger in which the bank’s capital ratio choices 
are constrained by regulatory pressure. In this sense, our study has elements of similarity to 
Jacques and Nigro (1997). 1415  
The dummy variable associated with one-standard deviation above the trigger may be 
regarded as introducing a simple regime switch in the model for low levels of the CRAR. In order 
to generalise this regime switch, we also estimate a switching regression model in which all the 
parameters on the conditioning variables (and not just the intercept) are allowed to change when 
the CRAR is less than one-standard deviation above the trigger. This specification allows for the 
possibility that all the dynamics of the capital ratio change when the bank is close to its regulatory 
minimum level of capital. 
                                                          
14 The idea of bank-specific capital requirement is also observed in the Report of the Committee on 
Banking Sector Reforms (Chairman: Shri M.Narasimham). As observed in the Report, “the RBI should 
also have the authority to raise [the minimum capital to risk assets ratio] further in respect of individual 
banks if in its judgement the situation with respect to their risk profile warrants such an increase” (pp.21, 
para 3.15). 
15 In Jacques and Nigro (1997), the regulatory pressure variables are defined in relation to the 8 per cent 
risk-based capital ratio. Since banks with total risk-based capital ratios above and below the 8 per cent 
regulatory minimum may react differently, the study partitioned regulatory pressure into two variables: 
RPG and RPL. RPL equals (1/RBCj-1/8) for all banks with a total risk-based capital ratio less than 8 per 
cent, and zero otherwise. A second regulatory pressure variable, RPG equals (1/8-1/RBCj) for all banks 
with total risk-based ratio greater than or equal to 8 per cent, zero otherwise. The econometric exercise then 
seeks to examine how the behavior of these two sets of banks in terms of capital requirement and risk-
taking activity is affected by the regulatory stipulations. 
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8. Results and discussion 
The result of the regression analysis is presented in Table 2. In the table, we report the 
regression results for the case in which the dependent variable is the CRAR. The analysis 
suggests that the capital requirements significantly affect banks’ capital ratio decisions. The 
coefficient on the regime dummy is positive and significant. The point estimate implies that 
banks increase their CRAR by about 40-percentage points per quarter when the capital ratio 
approaches the regulatory minimum. In addition, we find that banks raise their CRAR by roughly 
50 percent per quarter following an increase in the trigger ratio by the supervisors. Ediz et al.’s 
(1998) study revealed that, banks in the UK raised their CRAR by roughly 1/3 per quarter 
following an increase in the trigger ratio by the supervisors. 
In Column 3 of the table, we present the results for the regressions of changes in 100-per 
cent weighted assets as a ratio of total risk-weighted assets on a lagged level of this ratio and on 
the same conditioning variables as those included in the CRAR regressions. Although the 
parameter on the trigger dummy has the expected sign, it is insignificant. The NIRWA coefficient 
is significant, suggesting the possibility that increasing diversification by PSBs is engendering a 
significant change in 100-percent risk weighted assets. Among others, the coefficients on both 
profits and provision variables are significant, which is a pointer to the possibility that both higher 
profits and provisions lead banks to rely on asset substitution away from high risk-weighted 
assets to meet their capital requirements as they approach the regulatory minimum.  
 
9. Concluding remarks 
The observations have important implications for policy. Firstly, capital ratios seem to 
have an influence on bank’s decision-making. This fact assumes all the more relevance in view of 
the growing concerns about banking stability. Simply put, higher levels of capital can be useful in 
preventing systemic distress, which is a useful lever in the hands of policy makers. Secondly, the 
widespread belief of a movement away from loans and into Government securities seems 
unfounded. While some adjustments in a bank’s portfolio seem reasonable in the face of 
vicissitudes in the operating environment, such a phenomenon is not of a large magnitude. This 
observations gains prominence in view of the fact that the economy seems to be entering a high 
growth trajectory, which would necessitate a higher demand for loans. Combining the two 
aforesaid points, it seems fair to state that the Indian evidence makes capital requirements an 
attractive regulatory instrument since they serve to reinforce the stability of the banking system 
without apparently distorting the lending choices of banks. 
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Table 2: CRAR and 100-percent Weighted Assets Regression Results 
Variable CRAR HRRWA 
Constant  6.37 
(2.70)*
44.07 
(3.49)* 
Change in trigger dummy 
(TRIGD) 
0.48 
(3.19)*
-0.27 
(0.29) 
FIRWA -0.72 
(-0.68)
-4.70 
(1.79)# 
NIIRWA 0.57 
(1.15)
2.58 
(2.80)** 
BDRWA 0.08 
(1.59)#
0.02 
(0.15) 
CRAR trigger (<than 1 s.d.) 
(TARGD) 
0.36 
(-3.72)*
-0.55 
(1.26) 
OBSRWA -0.02 
(-1.58)#
0.003 
(0.12) 
PFRWA 1.02 
(2.79)*
1.18 
(2.13)** 
PVRWA -0.03 
(-0.07)
1.23 
(1.81)** 
HRRWA -0.004 
(-0.30)
 
Lagged Dependent Variable -0.72 
(-3.50)*
-0.55 
(-3.67)* 
Adjusted R2 0.43 0.26 
Test of GMM consistency  
(p-values) 
 
Sargan test 0.62 0.51 
No. of observations 324 324 
Figures in brackets indicate t-ratios. 
*, ** and # indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10 per cent, respectively.  
 
 
The purpose of the present exercise is to empirically analyse the impact of bank capital 
dynamics on the capital ratio choices of PSBs in India. Towards this end, we use quarterly 
supervisory data including detailed information about the balance sheet and profit and loss 
account of PSBs stretching over the period 1997 through 1999. Although such work has been 
carried out for several developed economies, viz., the UK, US and Switzerland, little work on this 
front appears to have been done for countries like India. 
The conclusions reached are reassuring in that capital requirements do seem to affect 
bank behaviour over and above the influence of the banks’ own internally generated capital 
targets. More importantly, such adjustments by banks in their capital ratios are effected primarily 
by boosting their capital rather than through systematic substitution away from high-risk loans. 
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